A colleague of mine recently posted a link to an information warfare-related article on an Iranian activism site.  Like-minded Iranian friends, affiliated with the Green movement, seemed to have as a goal to disseminate information about how to counter censorship in Iran by distributing tools, news, and other means of helping dissidents avoid having their communication muzzled and detected by the mullahs.

This particular article lists examples of electronic warfare by regime-friendly groups such as the “Iranian Cyber Army”, recently suspected of numerous attacks against organizations seen as hostile to the Iranian government.  Ironically, these included Chinese search engine baidu.com in retaliation for some perceived slight by the Chinese government — this shortly after several Chinese organizations have become increasingly implicated in online hits against U.S. and other Western government and corporate targets; a recent report in The Associated Press / The Guardian mention the Chinese universities Shanghai Jiaotong and Lanxiang Vocational Institute as sources of the “Aurora” attacks against Google and others.  On a humorous side note, if 1337 xenophobic script kiddies friendly with one totalitarian regime are now going after 1337 xenophobic script kiddies friendly with another totalitarian regime, it might become difficult to figure out who’s on whose side…

That said, there’s not much an outsider with technological know-how can do to help victims of censorship and repression in any country beyond providing them with the education and means to get around official repression of communication with each other and with the outside world, and to avoid being detected by government thugs while doing so.  A friend of mine, when asked to to provide help and information about censorship avoidance to an Iranian group, took a very cautious line, making it very very clear that he was reluctant to offer anything that carried even the slightest possibility of someone being arrested, tortured, or even killed if they were found using it.  I take a bit of a different view — solutions like PGP, TOR, Haystack, anonymous remailers, or SSL enabled CGI proxies, combined with private browsing available on most newer browsers, are powerful stuff, and with a modicum of care on the part of their users, can conspire to throw a hefty wrench into the surveillance machinations of dictatorial spooks.  The best anyone can do is to make users at risk of brutal crackdowns aware of what could possibly go wrong, give them a good head-start on how to use their new toys, and let them be adults about making an educated choice.  After all, in the case of the Iranian protesters, these are people who’re willing to go out on the street and be shot at for what they believe in.

So much for “passive” assistance — giving people better anonymous / encrypted communications tools and the knowledge on how to effectively use them.  What about active help, though?  Beyond the usual low-level stupidity found in IRC channels (e.g. background noise of the “www.bobsautodetailing.com pwn3d by H4X0RZ 4 ALLAH AGAINST 4m3r1kkkAH” variety), attacks on the infrastructure of Western countries and organizations from Russian, Iranian, North Korean, Chinese, and other groups, presumably with at least some tacit blessing from their governments, are pretty common.  Botnets designed to carry out probes and hits on infrastructure, launch DDoS attacks, create economic sabotage, steal sensitive data, and other bad things, are pretty common in the wild.

Cybercrime legislation in most developed countries is designed to pursue and allow prosecution of even casual probes by unauthorized persons.  Whether one agrees with laws or enforcement tactics or not, the goal is to keep anyone, no matter what motivates them, from generally screwing things up by spying, stealing, or vandalizing.  Unless it specifically takes into account intent, the law doesn’t differentiate between amateurs or professionals — it’s all a crime.  Why?   Partially because attacking a person/host/company/government via a network is the technologically easiest, least physically risky way of getting to the goodies, and because it’s often impossible to differentiate between the casual hacker and the much-vaunted bugaboo of organized cybercriminals and government-sponsored electronic espionage.  The idea, I suppose, is that tolerating any intrusion means that the world economic system as we know it will grind to a standstill (or at least your job and mine will be made that much more difficult.)  Maybe, maybe not, but without such laws as a deterrent, I’m sure the barriers to causing grief to legitimate business would be a lot lower.

But what of aiding and abetting attacks against distasteful regimes or their allies / henchmen?  A few years ago, the idea of counter-hacking, or ethical hacking aimed at taking out threats either by sabotaging those responsible or by “cleaning” affected infrastructures when unsuspecting owners could not or would not, was in high discussion.  Most security professionals in my circle of acquaintances seemed to be roundly against this concept, due to the potential for a slippery slope, and for unacceptable collateral damage — plus, what good is it to have and enforce laws against illicit intrusion when the “good guys” themselves are guilty of violating them, even if they are perfectly well-meaning?

Given how hungry my non-technical Iranian friends were for any information about “passive” tools as those described above, I’d imagine groups in opposition to the government (supposedly there’s now a “Green Cyber Army“) would imaginably be equally happy for any assistance from sympathetic types in the West.  As someone strictly in favor of the rule of law, I can’t condone any illegal actions of the sort these guys are indubitably carrying out, but anything that helps cause grief for kiddies hacking in the service of thugs is ok in my book.  A few dozen clicks to waste here and there to waste the bad guys’ bandwidth, a Metasploit download mirror, or an open proxy or TOR gateway probably wouldn’t violate the spirit of the law.  Wink wink.

Security Focus had an article yesterday about the virus attack that hit Second Life last Sunday. Apparently, this was a self-replicating exploit of the ability to create objects in SL, which bogged down servers.

A few years ago in a fit of mental masturbation, some colleagues and I postulated an online environment incorporating elements of Neal Stevenson’s Metaverse, Freenet, grid computing, various virtual currency incarnations such as e-gold, and various obfuscation, security and communications technologies. Underlying the concept was the nature of a computer; a processor, a bus and storage. And if you combine distributed computing, distributed storage and the Internet, voilà, a big computer.

With this in mind, the idea was basically to create a totally non-judgmental, uncontrolled secure and anoymous failure-resistant platform for online transactions — for legitimate business, tax evaders, kiddie pornographers, whoever. However, the parallel with the Metaverse doesn’t just stop at its distributed nature. Given the seemingly rising trend in attacks hitting MMORPGs and online communities, the villain Raven’s actual “Snow Crash” virus in Neal Stevenson’s book is something I can see being prototypical for a pretty big problem.

Picture this: just like with telephones and the Internet, commerce will adopt any new medium as a functional part of its business technology. So let’s say you have a totally decentralized, purely reputation-based, entirely secure transactions network of the sort that we’re postulating. For argument’s sake, let’s assume someone figures out how to exploit weaknesses in some of the protocols and/or client software used by participants in this kind of environment.

Given that the idea is to create a generally lawless state (i.e. not run by a company or controlled by a government agency, but designed to allow a green field for pure commerce), someone _will_ figure out a way to grief — be it for reasons of gain, sabotage, or pure vandalism. How do you respond to this? You have no recourse to Linden Labs, WIPO or the FBI. A community at large may not be sympathetic to, say, a Citibank under concentrated attack, and even then the response may be slow and ineffective.

A solution that comes to mind are variations on William Gibson’s “Black ICE” (i.e. the sort of strikeback capability that’s often poo-pooed and illegal in the real world.) However, in most virtual communities, there’s not enough of a “pay to play” mechanism to make vandals fear retribution, that they might lose their investment, and even if such a thing existed, there’s too much room for abuse (remember, who controls this? Even if there is a governing body, do you trust them?)

Just some thoughts.

This is a bit past its sell-by date, but Crypto-gram recently carried information of a story in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (German article) about a supposed plan by the “Special Tasks Service” (DBA) of the Swiss communications ministry (Uvek) to requre Swiss ISPs to assist in infecting Voice-over-IP endpoint PCs with trojans that would enable interception of VoIP communications, such as Skype, Vonage or other protocols.

According to the NZZ, the Swiss company ERA IT Solutions is behind the trojan’s development, although no technical information is given. I especially love the claim that “it’s designed to be undetectable by firewalls or virus scanners.” Or Macs, or tripwire on Solaris, but maybe they can have a chat with Joanna Rudkowska about how to do it. Regardless, F-Secure probably won’t cooperate, and seemed to take a dim view of this toy’s chances of success.

The DBA, created as the Uvek’s “dirty tricks and espionage” department, lists wiretapping among its core tasks. According to Swiss telco law, when to deploy such toys is still within the purview of the local authorities, although data protection and warrant mechanisms are not mentioned. The trojan may apparently be either surreptiously installed by the police, or through ISPs. Under the threat of coercion, I assume.

More information is at PC Pro. I honestly can’t imagine what the hell ERA’s marketing directory was thinking; if I were him, I’d be doing PR damage control like mad now. Needless to say, Keystone Kop trojans don’t seem to be listed on their products page.

This is about 3 months out of date (announced in June — hey, I’m just catching up on my reading) but a colleague just pointed me to an interesting technique designed to subvert Windows Vista security when runing under AMD 64 CPus. Named “Blue Pill“, it was developed by Joanna Rutkowska of Singapore security firm COSEINC and circumvents the Vista requirement for runtime code to be signed by running inside a hypervisor through AMD Pacifica SVM hardware virtualization and either disabling OS signature checking entirely, or, in the case of what she refers to as “level 2″, completely hiding the memory portion where Blue Pill sits.

According to Rutkowska, this is OS-independent; the malware can be injected at runtime through a privilege weakness in how Vista handles paged memory, and is persistent across reboots. Theoretically, this could be ported to Intel VT as well.

George Ou has an ZDNet blog entry that raises the interesting question of being able to detect this by running timing analysis — apparently, there is a possibility of hybernating the malware if a timing analysis is detected. He doesn’t address the possibility of something like just hitting the host in question with constant, random semi-DoS attacks to generate load and thus obfuscating results of a system timing check. On second thought, I assume any such well-written process would take this into consideration (as the network stack would just be handling additional load within its design parameters.) But as he points out, any malware could just diddle with the system clock anyway.

Virtualization.info has an interview with Anthony Liguori titled “Debunking Blue Pill Myth” that doesn’t really go very far towards debunking anything — part of his point is that virtualization under Vista will rely on TPM-based attestation, which is interesting, seeeing how a lot of enterprises I’m familiar with actually turn off TPM functionality, especially in laptops due to management issues.

We’ll see, I guess. Very cool though.

More links at

Computerworld

Enterprise IT Planet

Forwarded by a colleague, supposedly found on a Russian spyware forum a little while ago. This is as close to a formal software requirements doc as I’ve seen for an exploit / trojan. It describes in reasonably structured detail the elements required for development of a spam botnet trojan.

Click here to download

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