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	<title>Comments for Chakraborty Software</title>
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	<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch</link>
	<description>Information Security Consulting Services</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2010 07:33:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on Getting Started in Security by Adi</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/organization/getting-started-in-security/comment-page-1/#comment-3925</link>
		<dc:creator>Adi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2010 07:33:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/?p=199#comment-3925</guid>
		<description>I am a recent entry in to this field working as an analyst since about a year, having previously worked on grid computing. I can vouch for everything you have listed as being right on the mark, especially about people who end up in this field not starting in it.

Your blog has a lighter vein to it making it an extremely enjoyable read, which is a rare thing in this field full of MIB. Keep it coming.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am a recent entry in to this field working as an analyst since about a year, having previously worked on grid computing. I can vouch for everything you have listed as being right on the mark, especially about people who end up in this field not starting in it.</p>
<p>Your blog has a lighter vein to it making it an extremely enjoyable read, which is a rare thing in this field full of MIB. Keep it coming.</p>
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		<title>Comment on SSL / SSH and MTU Problems by john</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/standards/ssl-ssh-and-mtu-problems/comment-page-1/#comment-3465</link>
		<dc:creator>john</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2010 20:53:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=61#comment-3465</guid>
		<description>Hiya,

sorry, what is &quot;B/S&quot;?  

What kind of SSL gateway are you referring to (product)?  Is this the same for everyone?  Can you post a link to the customer&#039;s page?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hiya,</p>
<p>sorry, what is &#8220;B/S&#8221;?  </p>
<p>What kind of SSL gateway are you referring to (product)?  Is this the same for everyone?  Can you post a link to the customer&#8217;s page?</p>
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		<title>Comment on SSL / SSH and MTU Problems by penglx</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/standards/ssl-ssh-and-mtu-problems/comment-page-1/#comment-3464</link>
		<dc:creator>penglx</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2010 09:27:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=61#comment-3464</guid>
		<description>we accerd a problem while our customer use the pppoe through ssl Gateway proxy the B/S Application System.

the problem show as 
while the MTU of SSL Gateway set as 1200 we can visit the App(through SSL GATEWAY) but the net action is very slow as open a page need 30 seconds;
while the MTU of SSL GATEWAY set higher than 1200(such as 1300 1400) we can&#039;t visit the App

can you give me some suggestions

thank u 
Best wishes</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>we accerd a problem while our customer use the pppoe through ssl Gateway proxy the B/S Application System.</p>
<p>the problem show as<br />
while the MTU of SSL Gateway set as 1200 we can visit the App(through SSL GATEWAY) but the net action is very slow as open a page need 30 seconds;<br />
while the MTU of SSL GATEWAY set higher than 1200(such as 1300 1400) we can&#8217;t visit the App</p>
<p>can you give me some suggestions</p>
<p>thank u<br />
Best wishes</p>
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		<title>Comment on Securitrons and the Thunk Test by Peter</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/best-practices/securitrons-and-the-thunk-test/comment-page-1/#comment-3453</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2010 17:52:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/?p=163#comment-3453</guid>
		<description>As someone that has worked in several bank security management functions with high &quot;thunk&quot; factors, I think there is a solution.  However, that solution will require acceptance that a large part of the &quot;thunk&quot; has zero contribution to security, but is there for political and legal reasons, and that demands courage.

As yet, I&#039;m not convinced the courage, the will and especially the vision is there to reduce the amount of trees that go into security management.  A &quot;thunk&quot; says &quot;we&#039;ve put some work into this&quot;, which translates into &quot;we did everything we could&quot; if things go wrong.  It takes a brave person to state that the single sheet of A4 is equivalent..</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As someone that has worked in several bank security management functions with high &#8220;thunk&#8221; factors, I think there is a solution.  However, that solution will require acceptance that a large part of the &#8220;thunk&#8221; has zero contribution to security, but is there for political and legal reasons, and that demands courage.</p>
<p>As yet, I&#8217;m not convinced the courage, the will and especially the vision is there to reduce the amount of trees that go into security management.  A &#8220;thunk&#8221; says &#8220;we&#8217;ve put some work into this&#8221;, which translates into &#8220;we did everything we could&#8221; if things go wrong.  It takes a brave person to state that the single sheet of A4 is equivalent..</p>
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		<title>Comment on Autistic Security Event Monitoring by Alex</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/best-practices/autistic-security-event-monitoring/comment-page-1/#comment-3448</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Dec 2009 21:07:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=102#comment-3448</guid>
		<description>Hi John

Very interesting idea - I suggest you find out more as the condition is underreported and many high functioning people with autistic traits appear like normal people.

Such people could also take on the configuration of higher level automated processing and end up with more interesting exceptions to follow up.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi John</p>
<p>Very interesting idea &#8211; I suggest you find out more as the condition is underreported and many high functioning people with autistic traits appear like normal people.</p>
<p>Such people could also take on the configuration of higher level automated processing and end up with more interesting exceptions to follow up.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Windows vs. Unix Traceroute by GapingHeadwound</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/network-security/windows-vs-unix-traceroute/comment-page-1/#comment-3412</link>
		<dc:creator>GapingHeadwound</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2009 23:01:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=53#comment-3412</guid>
		<description>alias traceroute traceroute -I</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>alias traceroute traceroute -I</p>
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		<title>Comment on UFS Recovery &#8212; Hunting the Dead Filesystem by dimagromovfoto</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/forensics/ufs-recovery-hunting-the-dead-filesystem/comment-page-1/#comment-3406</link>
		<dc:creator>dimagromovfoto</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2009 13:06:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=29#comment-3406</guid>
		<description>Very Interesting post! Thank you for such interesting resource!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very Interesting post! Thank you for such interesting resource!</p>
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		<title>Comment on Risk Management &#8212; Useless? by john</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/risk-assessment/risk-management-useless/comment-page-1/#comment-3342</link>
		<dc:creator>john</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 17:41:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=94#comment-3342</guid>
		<description>Thanks -- I re-read the article in response to this, and I am going to have to respectfully disagree; if MR&#039;s point is that risk management can be done well, he sure hides it well.

Of course it is often (I wouldn&#039;t say &quot;typically&quot;, having worked in three organizations in a row with pretty good procedures) badly done, but that&#039;s not a fundamental failure of the concept.

Yes, on the historical data thing -- but as for the gut feeling, it may be a strong factor for the risk analyst, but I expect any organization to hire guys with enough experience to be able to make a fairly reliable educated guess.  As I said, there is always an element of witchcraft involved.  

Regarding the guy making the final decision -- any risk management organization worth its salt has a reasonably well-developed quantifiable set of classifications that will let a risk analyst present a manager with an easy decision.  

Because, rant as much as one may about &quot;it should always be done right&quot;, security is _always_ an economic decision, and when the choice is spending a million dollars to rectify a potential problem that might bring down your company but has in a one-in-a-million chance of occurrence, even if that one-in-a-million is not based on any methodical statistical analysis but on basic common sense, nobody has the right to fault a manager&#039;s acceptance of that.

I&#039;ve been doing a lot of medical compliance work, and while the idea of over-quantifying the scientific aspect of risk management, I&#039;ve seen it very rapidly degrade into a paper storm that exists for its own sake, without anyone really paying attention to the original reason for the paperwork&#039;s existence -- form becomes more important than substance.  The people I worked with in the medical industry were generally very conscientious, but at some point, paper and process fatigue will always set in.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks &#8212; I re-read the article in response to this, and I am going to have to respectfully disagree; if MR&#8217;s point is that risk management can be done well, he sure hides it well.</p>
<p>Of course it is often (I wouldn&#8217;t say &#8220;typically&#8221;, having worked in three organizations in a row with pretty good procedures) badly done, but that&#8217;s not a fundamental failure of the concept.</p>
<p>Yes, on the historical data thing &#8212; but as for the gut feeling, it may be a strong factor for the risk analyst, but I expect any organization to hire guys with enough experience to be able to make a fairly reliable educated guess.  As I said, there is always an element of witchcraft involved.  </p>
<p>Regarding the guy making the final decision &#8212; any risk management organization worth its salt has a reasonably well-developed quantifiable set of classifications that will let a risk analyst present a manager with an easy decision.  </p>
<p>Because, rant as much as one may about &#8220;it should always be done right&#8221;, security is _always_ an economic decision, and when the choice is spending a million dollars to rectify a potential problem that might bring down your company but has in a one-in-a-million chance of occurrence, even if that one-in-a-million is not based on any methodical statistical analysis but on basic common sense, nobody has the right to fault a manager&#8217;s acceptance of that.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been doing a lot of medical compliance work, and while the idea of over-quantifying the scientific aspect of risk management, I&#8217;ve seen it very rapidly degrade into a paper storm that exists for its own sake, without anyone really paying attention to the original reason for the paperwork&#8217;s existence &#8212; form becomes more important than substance.  The people I worked with in the medical industry were generally very conscientious, but at some point, paper and process fatigue will always set in.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Risk Management &#8212; Useless? by John Annen</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/risk-assessment/risk-management-useless/comment-page-1/#comment-3341</link>
		<dc:creator>John Annen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 09:11:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=94#comment-3341</guid>
		<description>Hi John,

I think you&#039;ve missed the point Marcus Ranum was trying to make. As I understand it, he&#039;s not saying risk management as a concept is bad, but that it is typically poorly implemented in information security, because the data is not there to do a solid quantitative risk analysis. 

I have also observed this. Because of poor or nonexistent historical data, the risk-benefit analysis leading to information security decisions often boils down to one person&#039;s gut feeling vs. an other&#039;s. Furthermore, given that the person making the final decision might not have any experiential basis for even a good gut feeling, the decision often comes down to who makes the best presentation of their argument, or who has the best relationship with the decision maker, rather than the merits of the argument itself.

The only way I know of to improve the situation is to implement comprehensive quality improvement systems based on solid scientific research. One place we can look for examples as to how to do this is medicine, where it is now commonplace. What we also see in medicine, unfortunately, is that such systems are very expensive, and require cooperation between disparate entities, such as governments, higher education and private enterprise, on a scale that I don&#039;t think the private sector will be willing to fund.

That means we will not see substantial gains until governments step in to fund and coordinate the necessary research, and/or we see the formation of large nonprofits to do it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi John,</p>
<p>I think you&#8217;ve missed the point Marcus Ranum was trying to make. As I understand it, he&#8217;s not saying risk management as a concept is bad, but that it is typically poorly implemented in information security, because the data is not there to do a solid quantitative risk analysis. </p>
<p>I have also observed this. Because of poor or nonexistent historical data, the risk-benefit analysis leading to information security decisions often boils down to one person&#8217;s gut feeling vs. an other&#8217;s. Furthermore, given that the person making the final decision might not have any experiential basis for even a good gut feeling, the decision often comes down to who makes the best presentation of their argument, or who has the best relationship with the decision maker, rather than the merits of the argument itself.</p>
<p>The only way I know of to improve the situation is to implement comprehensive quality improvement systems based on solid scientific research. One place we can look for examples as to how to do this is medicine, where it is now commonplace. What we also see in medicine, unfortunately, is that such systems are very expensive, and require cooperation between disparate entities, such as governments, higher education and private enterprise, on a scale that I don&#8217;t think the private sector will be willing to fund.</p>
<p>That means we will not see substantial gains until governments step in to fund and coordinate the necessary research, and/or we see the formation of large nonprofits to do it.</p>
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		<title>Comment on UFS Recovery &#8212; Hunting the Dead Filesystem by rutac</title>
		<link>http://www.chakraborty.ch/forensics/ufs-recovery-hunting-the-dead-filesystem/comment-page-1/#comment-3325</link>
		<dc:creator>rutac</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2009 19:13:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chakraborty.ch/blog/?p=29#comment-3325</guid>
		<description>please solution for ufs 3 Mr</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>please solution for ufs 3 Mr</p>
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